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endowment and the duration of the dictatorial regime is mediated by the price of oil. Using a 
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 1 Introduction
The academic literature does not get to a clear-cut conclusion concerning whether nat-
ural resources are a boone or a bane for dictators. The dierences in the outcomes are
mainly related to the preliminary assumptions made on the benets of a coup d' etat. The
rst strand of literature - and the majority of empirical studies - follows the theoretical
tradition of Olson (1965) and Tullock (1987) that a regime change creates social benets
and the issue of non-excludability raises a public good problem that the challengers need
to overcome. Olson (1965) suggests that a successful deposition of the dictator results
in social benets either in a total regime change to more democracy or the sole replace-
ment by a ruler favorable for other groups in society. In either case, the insurgents face a
public good problem as they may not (fully) exclude other individuals from the benets
of a coup d' etat. The survival of a dictator is assumed to depend on his ability to deter
opposing groups in society from cooperation or buy support from political and military
elites. Tullock (2005) points out that autocratic leaders are more likely to be overthrown
by forces within the government or the military than by a revolution of the people. A
higher endowment of resources gives the dictator the opportunity to counteract cooper-
ation of oppositional groups and increase his probability of staying in power. Empirical
studies analysing the persistence of autocratic systems (e.g. Ross 2001, Tsui 2005) have
applied this theoretical context and conclude that oil is, in general, an impediment to
democracy. Smith (2004) goes a step further and investigates the eect of oil dependency
on regime-durability, including both democratic as well as autocratic regimes. His results
support previous ndings, that oil-rich states in the developing world are less likely to
experience an overall regime change. In contrast to the literature on oil-endowment and
regime change (e.g. Morrison 2007, Ross 2001), this paper is more related to the literature
of leader succession within an autocratic regime (e.g. Kurrild-Klitgaard 2000). We follow
the argument by Tullock (1987) that autocratic regimes are rather durable while replace-
ment of individual dictators is rather common and exploit this within-regime variance for
our empirical analysis.
The standard political economic model of the behavior of dictators is rather straightfor-
ward: The dictator's objective function is the maximization of personal utility via the
increase of political rents and subject to the constraint of maintaining political power
(Olson 1965, Olson 1991, Tullock 1987). Dictators collect resources from the population
and increase personal and family gain as well as amenities of the ruling elite. These in-
ecient transfer policies are accompanied by a decline in economic development and the
degradation of living conditions for at least some groups in society. Sooner or later, un-
satised citizens might demand a regime change or the deposition of the dictator. Tullock
(1987) argues that not all dictators are overthrown and some might apply a divide-and-
conquer strategy to decrease the likelihood of a coup d' etat. Olson (2000) argues that
once a dominant "bandit" emerges from a kleptocracy by monopolizing power, he has in-
centives to limit his theft acitivities on society and provide some public goods. Excessive
theft discourages productive activity and thus reduces future wealth while the provision
of public goods enhances income he may exploit for personal gain.
1Some of the political rents are used to deter citizens from oppositional activities and to
ensure that the dictator stays in power. In order to remain in power, a dictator can choose
to invest in increasing the base of supporters and/or repressing of oppositional groups.1
Wintrobe (1990) uses the notation of a simple production function with the input factors
`loyalty' and `repression' and the output `political survival' to describe the relationship
between political survival and the instruments of asserting political power. An increased
use of the production factors results in more political power, however, with diminishing
returns. Factor prices are assumed to be exogenously given and the factor input is sub-
ject to a budget constraint, which basically equals the tax revenue. Although the dictator
has a self-interest in setting the tax-rate at a level that does not completely distort in-
centives for social production (McGuire and Olson 1996, Olson 1993), inecient policies
and possible economomic degradation increase the risk of a coup d' etat. Sala-i-Martin
and Subramanian (2003) show how elites used their power to grant import licences and
privileges to cronies and developed a system of corruption that ultimately led to negative
eects on long-run growth in Nigeria. A comprehensive overview on the eects of natural
resource wealth on instituions and corruption is provided by van der Ploeg (2007). Un-
der the assumptions that most of the rents from natural resources are absorbed by the
dictator (e.g. royalties) and that the ruler cannot inuence the price of the input factors
loyalty and repression, autocratic leaders of countries with a bigger endowment of natural
resource have a less constrained budget and may use more of the instruments ensuring
their power. Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier (2004) illustrate how President Mobuto
used rents from natural ressources to buy o political competitors.
The second strand of literature relates to the ideas of Tullock (1987) that particular
dictators (but not necessarily the autocratic regime itself) have an inherent "stability
problem". The key argument is that natural resource endowment can become a `curse'
not just for the overall economy, but also for its ruler. One prominent example is Nigeria,
the world's eighth largest oil producer, that has witnessed eight successful coup d' etats
between its independence in 1960 and 1993 (Caselli 2006). This theory combines two
dierent ideas: The rst one is that regime change is more driven by private incentives
of the challengers or insurgents rather than by the overall social benet of deposing the
dictator (e.g. Grossman 1991). The second one is that natural resources are rents that
are more easily appropriated by the ruling elite and thus itensify the rent-seeking contest
between various groups in society (Caselli 2006, Hodler 2006).2 Tornell and Lane (1999)
denes this rent-seeking contest as the `voracity eect'.
A recent theoretical paper by Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2008) studies the role
of the military in non-democratic regimes. In their model the military can act as the
dictatorship's tool of repression. However, in cases where the ruling elite insuciently
1Regarding the former instrument, Becker (1983) argues that the behavior of a dictator is comparable
to the behavior of a democratic politician trying to increase its support among citizens and interest groups.
The autocratic institutional setting, however, enables the dictator to apply additional mechanisms to
incentivate support.
2An econometric analysis of the probability of civil war by Collier and Hoeer (2004) supports this
idea.
2compensates the generals and soldiers, the army might stage a coup and replace the ex-
isting ruling elite by a military dictatorship. Adding natural resources to their model
results in two opposing eects for the regime: One the one hand, greater natural resource
abundance allows the non-democratic regime to nance repression through the military
and thus increases its likelihood to persist. On the other hand, greater natural ressource
endowment increases the benets of the army to stage a coup d' etat, install a military
dictatorship and thus decreases the survival likelihood of the existing regime.
This paper provides a comprehensive empirical analysis on the relationship between nat-
ural resource endowment, in particular oil reserves, and dictator duration that combines
aspects of both strands of literature. We rst present a simple theoretical framework
that illustrates the incentives driving the behaviour of the dictator and the oppositional
group based on the expected benets from natural resources. Under certain assumptions,
a higher endowment of natural resources leads to a lower probability of the oppositional
group staging a coup d' etat. Using a dataset on 106 dictators, our empirical analysis sup-
ports this prediction. The theoretical setting is presented in Section 2 and the empirical
results are presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2 A simple theoretical setting for dictator turnover
and natural resources
We illustrate the role of natural resources in the political interplay between a dictator
and its kingmakers using a very simple theoretical framework. The role of the model is
not to provide a full-edged equilibrium theory for the role of natural resources on dicta-
tor turnover, but to illustrate the mechanisms at play in the relationship, and it can be
thought of as a static version of the intertemporal leadership turnover model put forward
by Gallego and Pitchik (2004).
Consider a dictator which is supported by a group of n 1 kingmakers in order to remain
in power (so that the group we consider - dictator plus kingmakers - is of size n). The
country exports a natural resource, say oil, which is traded at an exogenous price p in
the international market. In a given period, the dictator observes the realized price of
the export, p (an i.i.d. random variable) and decides on an eort level x 2 [0;1] aimed at
exploiting the natural resource further (by engaging in new oil drillings, for instance). The
production of the natural resource is an increasing, concave, positive function of eort
Y (x), where Y (0) = Y0  0 represents the country's tradable natural resource endow-
ment. For simplicity, assume a function Y (x) = Y0+ ~ Y (x), where ~ Y (0) = 0 and ~ Y (x)  0,
~ Y 0(x) > 0, ~ Y 00(x) < 0. The revenue of the export, pY (x) is divided among the dictator
and the kingmakers, each receiving pY (x)=n. The dictator receives an extra payo of
W(p) and has to bear a cost of eort, C(x), where C(x) > 0, C0(x) > 0, C00(x) > 0
and C(0) = 0. The extra rent that the dicator receives is assumed for the moment to be
independent of the export price, W(p) = W, below we will also discuss the case where W
is allowed to depend on p.
3A representative kingmaker decides whether to stage a coup d' etat (which is assumed to
be successful with probability ) by comparing the benets of remaining a kingmaker with
those of becoming the new dictator. The benets of remaining a kingmaker are given by















, where it is assumed that if the coup
is not successful the kingmaker's payo is zero. It is also assumed that the costs of eort
have been paid by the dictator before the coup takes place. The latter expression takes
into account that only one of the n   1 kingmakers can become a dictator. We assume
that all kingmakers have equal probability of becoming a dictator if the coup is successful,
and that unanimity among kingmakers is necessary for the coup to be carried out.
The level of eort of the dictator that makes the kingmaker indierent between staging
or not a coup is given by x(p), which equalizes Bk(p) and Bd(p), that is,
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which is decreasing on Y0, the natural resource endowment, and p, the price of the export.
A higher endowment on natural resources, as well as a higher price of the resource, ensure
larger payments to the kingmakers, which in turn decreases the level of eort required
from the dictator by the kingmakers so as for them not to attempt a coup. The repre-
sentative kingmaker decides to carry out the coup d' etat if the level of eort that the
dictator invests is lower than x(p).




+ W   C(x); x  x
(p) (2)
if he3 decides to meet the level of eort required by the no-coup condition, and








if he decides to invest a lower eort level. Let ~ x(p) be the level of eort that maximizes
dictator prots for a given level of export price,








If, for a realized price  p, ~ x( p) > x( p), the dictator chooses ~ x( p) and no coup takes place.
On the other hand, for the case ~ x( p) < x( p), the dictator would choose ~ x( p) if
(1   )

 pY (~ x( p))
n
+ W   C(~ x( p))

>
 pY (x( p))
n
+ W   C(x
( p)): (5)
3We decided not to use gender-neutral language, since we only have two female dictators in our sample,
who stayed very short in oce.
4If the probability of success in the coup is low enough, or is believed to be low enough by
the dictator, he would not meet the level of eort required by the kingmakers for any price
realization, and they would stage a coup whenever p is such that ~ x( p) < x( p). This is the
case that is portrayed in Figure 1, which shows ~ x(p) against x(p) for a price process which
is assumed to have a continuous distribution function F(p) with support on [pmin;pmax].
The probability of a coup d' etat is given by F(p), that is, the probability that the price
realization is such that ~ x( p) < x( p). Ceteris paribus, a country with a higher endow-
ment of the natural resource (see gray line in Figure 1) will have a lower probability of a
coup, F(p). The theoretical model concludes that for societies where the probability of
success in a coup d' etat is very low and resource revenues are not used for the exclusive
benet of the dictator, the dictator of a country with a larger oil endowment and larger
oil exploitation has a lower probability of being challenged by the kingmakers group and
therefore dictatorships in oil-rich countries should, ceteris paribus, have a longer duration.
If we assume that W is a function of the resource price, the slope of x(p) depends on the
properties of W(p)=p. We may think of W(p) as representing non-tradable, xed natural
resource reserves which are exclusively used by the dictator. This interpretation would
imply that W(p) is linear on p and refers to the value of the reserves of the dictator. If
this is the case, x(p) is independent of p and thus the x(p) line in Figure 1 is vertical.
Quantitatively, the eect of changes in the tradable natural resource endowment (Y0) on
the probability of a coup being initiated would be larger in this case. However, to the
extent that dierences in natural resource endowments across countries represent dier-
ences in both traded (Y0, shared with the kingmakers) and non-traded natural resources
(W(p)=p, property of the dictator), their eect on regime duration is ambiguous. On the
one hand, ceteris paribus, higher dictator-owned resources increase the probability of a
coup through the requirement from the side of the kingmakers of a higher level of eort
by the dictator. On the other hand, the eect of increases in the traded resource goes in
the opposite direction.
The timing of events in this simplied model is assumed to start with the export price
being revealed, which implies that we abstract from any strategic interaction between the
dictator and the kingmakers. A fully-edged model with both an intertemporal and a
strategic dimension dealing with leader turnover is given by Gallego and Pitchik (2004).
3 Empirical evidence: A duration model for dictators
The basic result of the theoretical model is that oil abundancy increases the duration of
dictatorships. In this section we specify a duration model for dictatorships to test this
hypothesis using a dataset including information on 106 dictators.
3.1 The specication of the duration model for dicators
The empirical investigation on the duration of dictatorships can be carried out by formu-
lating a survival model for dictators. Survival models are applicable for data where for












Figure 1: Natural resource endowment and the probability of a coup d' etat
In our case, the survival criterion is dened by dictator i being in power in year t. The
time until the event of failure of a dictator occurs is the variable of interest and the sum
of the years a given dictator i is in power gives his duration.
We specify the survival of dictators by means of a standard parametric proportional
hazard model (see e.g. Kalbeisch and Prentice 2002, Cleves, Gould and Gutierrez 2004),
which is given by
hic(tjxic) = h0(t)exp(xicx); (6)
where hic is the hazard a dictator i faces in a country c. hic(t) is proportional to the
baseline hazard h0, at time t and depends on a row vector xic of explaining variables
with the corresponding column vector of regression coecients x. The exponential func-
tion assures that hic(t) remains non-negative. The functional form of h0(t) needs to be
specied.4 Since the interest of this investigation lies in the duration of dictatorships we
reformulate the standard hazard model in the log-time metric, which yields
ln(tic) = xicx + i; (7)
where the distribution of the error term depends on the assumed distribution of ic =
exp(xicx)tic. From ic = exp( xicx)tic follows that tic = exp(xix)ic and that
ln(tic) = xicx + ln(ic): (8)
The distribution of ln(ic) depends on the distributional assumption of ic. In empirical
applications the choice of the distribution of ic determines the distribution of the error
term. Moreover, ic is usually assumed to have a mean of 0. If one, for example, assumes
ic  Exponentialfexp(0)g then: ln(tic) = 0 + xicx + ic, where the error term ic
4In principle, one is free to pick any positive function for h(0), however, commonly used functional
forms are, for example, the exponential, Weibull or Gompertz functions.
6follows the extreme-value distribution.
In our empirical investigation we estimate equations like (8) for ve dierent distributional
assumptions on ic. The baseline specication of the log time-to-failure model for dictators
for a given year t is given by:
ln(tic) = 1 lnAgei + 2 lnMedian Survivalc + 3 lnGDP p.c.c
+ 4GDP p.c. Growthc + 5 lnPopulationc + 6 lnRents - other Resourcesc
+ 7 lnOil Productionc + 8 lnOil Price
+ 9(lnOil Productionc  lnOil Price) + ln(ic): (9)
The corresponding proportional hazard specication, assuming h0(t) to be Gompertz
distributed, can be written as:
hic(tjxic) = exp(t)exp(1 lnAgei + 2 lnMedian Survivalc + 3 lnGDP p.c.c
+ 4GDP p.c. Growthc + 5 lnPopulationc + 6 lnRents - other Resourcesc
+ 7 lnOil Productionc + 8 lnOil Price
+ 9(lnOil Productionc  lnOil Price); (10)
where  describes the shape of the baseline hazard. For  = 0 the Gompertz distribution
reduces to the exponential hazard form, while a positive (negative)  indicates that h0(t)
increases (decreases) with time.
From equations (9) and (10) one can easily see that the interpretation of the estimated
coecients will be dierent. A positive (negative) eect of a given variable in the log-time
metric extends the expected time to failure which corresponds to a negative (positive) im-
pact of the variable on the hazard rate in the proportional hazard metric. Therefore, we
expect the signs of the estimated eects in equation (10) to be exactly the opposite of the
eects obtained using log-metric formulation.
The empirical specication assumes that the duration of dictators depends on a mixture
of dictator-specic and country-specic determinants. We follow the existing literature
on leadership duration and in particular Bienen and van der Walle (1992) to identify po-
tential control variables which might be able to explain dierences in the duration across
dictators in dierent countries. Due to bounded life expectancy, the rst obvious candi-
date as explanatory variable is the dictator's entry age. We expect dictators of advanced
age when coming into power will have a shorter log-time to failure, simply due to natu-
ral death or less physical strength to defend oneself from a coup d' etat. To account for
the country-specic tradition in staging coup d' etats we additionally include the median
survival time of the political leaders in each country since 1875. We expect dictators to
survive longer in countries where traditionally leaders are in power for longer time peri-
ods. Lipset (1960) claims that political stability and therefore the duration of political
leaders depends on the economic environment in which the leader acts. In democratically
organized countries we would expect decreasing hazard rates with higher GDP growth
7rates and a higher income level, although this relationship must not necessarily be true
for countries which are governed by dictators.
The development of sound economic conditions is often associated with the size of a
country. The literature on viability of countries tends to nd that large countries are
sustainable in economic terms (Robinson 1960). On the other hand governability of coun-
tries seems to become more dicult in large countries. Therefore, the eect of the size of
a country on dictator survival is in principle ambiguous. However, the size of the country
should inuence the duration of dictators and we control for this eect including a coun-
try's population as a proxy variable. We enlarge the baseline specication with variables
proxying the role of natural resources on the duration of dictators. Since we are inter-
ested on the sole eect of oil on the duration, we control for rents obtained from other
natural resources. We include a variable which captures the sum of all rents obtained
from dierent natural resources.5 The variables of interest in the model are oil produc-
tion and the oil price. Since our model implies that for a given number of kingmakers
the per-kingmaker revenue from the exported oil increases with Y (x) the probability of
staging a coup d' etat decreases with oil production, and therefore the expected dura-
tion of a dictator increases. The duration of an oil-blessed dictator is expected to ceteris
paribus exceed the length of a dictatorial term in a country which is not endowed with oil.
The logic of the theoretical setting presented above implies that the oil price realization
mediates between the incentives of dictator and kingmakers and results on an equilibrium
being chosen where either a coup d' etat is staged or the dictatorial status quo remains
in place. We therefore add the world oil price as an extra regressor as well as its interac-
tion with oil production in order to account for possible parameter heterogeneity on the
response to price changes depending on the size of the oil sector.
3.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Information on oil production is available only for the years 1980 until 2004, thus limiting
the scope of our analysis to this time period. The information on entry, exit and on the
entry age of the dictators is taken from ARCHIGOS, a panel data set on political lead-
ers from 1875 until 2004 for 188 countries (see Goemans, Gleditisch and Chiozza 2007).
ARCHIGOS is used to calculate the duration of the dictators and serves to construct
the country-specic median survival variable, which is the median duration of political
leaders in a given country since 1875. Real GDP per capita and its growth rate, as well
as population data are obtained from the Penn World Table 6.2 (Heston, Summers and
Aten 2006).6 The information on the rents from dierent natural resources is taken from
the World Bank's Adjusted Net Savings data and measured in US dollars. Information
5Information is available for rents obtained from natural gas, bauxite, copper, gold, lead, nickel, ore,
phosphate, tin, zinc, silver, hardcoal and softcoal.
6In our robustness analysis we additionally include explanatory variables such as ination, which is
obtained from the World Bank's World Development Indicators 2005 Database and the average years of
education of countries population. The education data are taken from the IIASA-VID dataset, which
contains broad information on educational attainment. Details on this dataset are provided by Lutz,
Goujon, Samir and Sanderson (2007) and Crespo-Cuaresma, Lutz and Sanderson (2008).
8on oil production and on the annual average oil price is provided by the U.S. Energy In-
formation Administration. Oil production is measured in thousand barrels per day, while
the oil price is stated in US dollars per barrel.
The restriction of the dataset to dictators is done using information provided by the Polity
IV Project (see Marshall and Jaggers 2005). The Polity IV database oers a score vari-
able (polity2) which combines two other score variables (Democ and Autoc) and proxies
the political system in a country. The Democ and Autoc scores include information on
competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, constraints on chief executive,
regulation and competitiveness of participation. The polity2 measure is dened as De-
moc minus Autoc and ranges from +10 to -10 with -10 implying a strongly autocratic
regime and +10 a strongly democratic regime. Unfortunately, the use of a score variable
as restriction of the data set requires an ad hoc decision on the cut-o level. We decide
to include only dictators with a polity2 score smaller than -6 into the nal data set. This
cut-o level seems to be restrictive enough and leaves us with 647 dictator-year observa-
tions and 106 dictators.7 However, in our robustness analysis we reduce our data set to
the most autocratic political systems as well.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables from the baseline specication
and for the variables used in the robustness analysis. On average, the observed dictators
are in power for about 12 years with a relatively high standard deviation of 10 years. 12
out of the 106 observed dictators failed within the rst year of their dictatorship. The
maximum dictatorship duration in our sample is 45 years and is associated with the re-
gency of Cuba's Fidel Castro.8
In terms of the explanatory variables, Table 1 shows some interesting data characteristics.
The dictators analyzed here came into power with an average age of about 47 years. The
entry age at the beginning of their leadership varies between 17 and 79 years. On average
the observed dictators stay about 3.5 years longer in power compared to the median
survival of their political predecessors. The average annual growth rate of GDP per
capita between 1980 and 2004 for the countries in our sample is 0.8 percentage points,
with very large cross country and time variation. Regarding the size of the countries, the
average country population in the sample is about 50.8 million. On average, 669 thousand
barrels of oil are produced per day. Restricting the sample to oil-producing countries
alone, the average value increases to a production of 1,082 thousand oil barrels daily.
The distribution concerning dictators in oil-producing versus non oil-producing countriess
shows that the majority of the observed dictators engage in oil production. In 395 out of
the 647 dictator-year observations a non-zero value of oil production is observed. Saudi
Arabia represents the country with the maximum amount of oil production in our sample.
Other large oil producers are China, Iraq, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. In the
empirical literature a variety of measures for oil wealth have been used. Smith (2004)
7Compared to the classication by Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi and Przeworski (1996) the dataset used
here represents a more restrictive sub-sample of dictators. See our robustness analysis for the sensitivity
of our results to changes in the denition of dictatorial regimes.
8Note that the duration of the dictatorship is calculated relative to 2004 for leaders which are still in

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10for example, constructed an oil dependence variable, that is the ratio of the value of oil
exports to gross domestic product. However, the kingmakers' behaviour depend most
likely on actual as well as expected rents from a nation's oil endowment (Hodler 2006).
Oil dependence is a good variable to describe the actual potential to extract political rents
and to ensure regime durability. Using oil-production as an indicator for oil-endowment
and oil-price as an indicator for present and potential future prices (and rents) allows us
to examine both, the potential for political rents as well as the potential for rent-seeking
contests.
Figure 2: Lifetable Dictators Without and With Oil Production
Figure 3: Unconditional Hazard Rate Estimation over Time
11Since the aim of the paper is to investigate dierences in the duration of oil producing
and non-oil producing dictators, Figures 2 and 3 provide a rst picture of the relationship
between oil production and dictators survival. In Figure 2 the proportion of surviving to
failing dictators is plotted against their years in power. The share of surviving dictators
is always higher for those countries which engage in oil production. In particular, 70.63
percent of the dictators who engage in oil drilling are still in power after 5 years of dic-
tatorship, while only 59.92 percent of the non-oil producing dictators survive the rst 5
years. The dierence in the proportion of survivals achieves its maximum between 15 and
25 years duration of a regency (i.e 29.11 percent of all dictators who are blessed with oil
`survive' until a dictatorship duration of 20 years while for their counterparts only 11.90
percent stay in power after this time).
Figure 3 shows (unconditional) kernel estimates for the coup d' etat hazard rate at each
point in time. The (estimated) hazard rate for dictators in countries without signicant
oil production always exceeds the corresponding hazard probability for oil-disposing au-
tocrats. Moreover, the kernel estimates suggest that the hazard rate (i.e the risk of a
successfull coup d' etat) is a non-linear function of dictatorship duration. Especially, the
hazard rate for oil producing dictators decreases after 9 years in power and begins to
increase again after a duration of about 21 years. Additionally, the marginal hazard rate
tends to increase with dictators years in power capturing the increasing rate of natural
deaths for older dictators. Interestingly, the increase in the marginal hazard rate takes
place earlier for the group of dictators who are not endowed with oil reserves.
Summing up, the descriptive statistics and the (unconditional) kernel estimates suggest
that dictatorship duration of oil-blessed autocrats tends to last for a longer time period
than for their non-oil-endowed counterparts, thus supporting the results of our simple
theoretical model. To control for other (potential) driving forces of this dierence in
leadership duration we estimate the above mentioned models given by equation (9) and
(10).
3.3 Estimation Results
Table 2 provides the results concerning the baseline specications for 6 dierent functional
forms of the baseline hazard. Due to data limitations in the explanatory variables we lose
213 dictator-year observations corresponding to 29 dictators. At the bottom of Table 2
we report the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) for each functional form specication.
According to the BIC, the (parsimonious) exponential functional form model is preferred.
The exponential hazard function disposes of only one shape parameter, which is restricted
to 1. For this reason, the exponential distribution assumes constant hazard rates over time
indicating that in our sample the baseline survival probability for dictators is independent
of the years in power.
The estimation results in Table 2 are very similiar across functional forms. We base our
discussion here on the exponential form of the model, since according to the BIC it is
the preferred one. In detail, dictators with advanced entry age have { ceteris paribus { a

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































13with previous research. Using a sample of all political leaders, Bienen and van der Walle
(1992) nd that an additional year of entry age adds 2 percent risk of losing power. The
political tradition in the analyzed countries aects dictatorship duration in the sense that
in countries where the median survival time of political leaders is historically higher the
duration of the considered dictatorships is signicantly increased. Interestingly, neither
the wealth of a country (measured via the level of real GDP per capita) nor economic
growth (measured in terms of annual average real GDP per capita growth) are able to
signicantly explain dierences in duration across dictators. On average, a higher level of
GDP p.c tends to decrease the log-time to failure while higher GDP p.c growth rates tend
to promote the duration of dictatorships. However, both of the eects are consistently
insignicant and, therefore, economic welfare (as measured by these variables) seems to
have very limited explanatory power in models of dictatorship duration. In contrast,
country size tends to matter. Dictators in countries with large populations face a longer
log-time to failure. The corresponding eect in the preferred model is statistically signif-
icant at the 1 percent level. Finally, the inclusion of additional rents from other natural
resources besides oil exhibit a positive but insignicant eect on the duration of dictators.
With regard to our variables of interest, as predicted by our model, a higher level of oil
production increases the log-time to failure for the considered dictators, and one may
conclude that crude oil reserves strengthen the political power of dictators. The second
variable of special concern is the average annual world oil price. This variable exhibits a
highly signicant negative impact on the log-time to failure for the dictators in our sam-
ple, indicating that an increase in the oil price increases the probability of a successful
coup d' etat, resulting in a regime change. In the internal logic of our model, kingmakers
enhance their expectations concerning the future rents of being the king when observing
a higher oil price and, therefore, more probably stage a coup d' etat. The parameter es-
timate for the interaction eect between the oil price and oil production gives evidence
that this eect tends to be more pronounced for countries with high oil production.
To investigate the robustness of our results we vary our analysis in two ways: Firstly, we
exclude some of the variables which enter insignicantly in the preferred baseline speci-
cation and/or add some additional regressors. Secondly, we split our sample into several
sub-samples according to our selection variable (polity2) to assess whether our baseline
results are driven by the ad hoc denition of dictators. Tables 3 and 4 illustrate the
corresponding results. The bottom of Table 3 shows that due to dierent model specica-
tions the included number of observation in the estimation procedure varies between 161
dictator-year observations (corresponding to 43 dierent dictators) for the largest model
and 536 dictator-year observations (including 90 dictators) for parsimoniously specied
models. The rst column shows the results for the baseline specication including year
xed eects. The inclusion of year xed eects allows to control for uctuations of com-
mon coup d' etats probabilities over time. Additionally, the year xed eects more ac-
curately capture all other unobserved year specic determinants of coup d' etats, which
would otherwise be partly incorporated in the annual oil price eect. Consequently, in
this specication all year specic variables such as the oil price are nested in the time




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































15of dictatorships again remains robust - positive and slightly signicant.9 In the next four
columns we report estimation results excluding the level of real GDP p.c. and/or real
GDP p.c growth and the rents from other natural resources. The BIC of the model where
only the level of GDP p.c. is excluded indicates that this model should be preferred to
the baseline specication.10 The results of this specication are virtually identical to the
baseline. Columns 3 to 5 in Table 3 depict comparable results with a few exceptions.
While the eect of oil production is relatively unchanged, the eects of entry age and
especially the world oil price are very sensitive to several modications. The exclusion of
those variables which enter insignicantly increases the eect of the entry age from -0.865
(baseline specication) to -1.195 (model without level of real GDP p.c, GDP p.c growth
and rents from other natural resources. More interestingly, the corresponding oil world
price eect changes from -2.752 to -1.307 which, moreover, is statistically not dierent
from zero. This result suggests that the negative eect of the average annual world oil
price might be specic to the subsample of dictators where information on real GDP per
capita and its growth rate as well as rents from other resources is available.11 The last
three columns of Table 3 report estimation results for models where information on the
country's average years of education and the annual ination rate is additionally included.
The inclusion of these variables can be justied as an additional robustness check that
controls for dierences in the probability of a coup being successful, since macroeconomic
stability and human capital are usually claimed to be important determinants of civil
conict in empirical cross-country and panel studies (see Collier and Hoeer 2004). The
incorporation of both of these variables dramatically reduces our dataset to a minimum
number of 161 dictator-year observations (corresponding to 43 dictators), however, the re-
sults are robust against this modication, at least the signs of all variables are unchanged
and only the eect of the entry age becomes insignicant. Both ination and education
tend to increase the log-time to failure, but the only signicant eect is observable for
education in the very small sample.12
Table 4 shows the estimation results using the baseline specication for sub-samples of
our data set. Again, the number of observations becomes small, which (at least partially)
leads to sensitive results. For this reason, we limit the discussion of the results to the
robustness of the direction of the inuence (i.e. signs) and their statistical signicance.
9The exclusion of GDP p.c. and/or real GDP p.c growth in this specication increases the impact
and the level of signicance of the oil production covariate.
10Since, the rst specication is the only one with the same number of observations and, therefore,
directly comparable to the baseline specication. In all other robustness checks the number of observations
dier from the baseline specication, rendering a direct comparison in terms of BIC impossible.
11This nding is supported by the fact that the oil world price eect becomes signicantly again if we
restrict the model from column 5 to the sample used in the baseline specication.
12Finally, we applied more robustness checks where we additionally (i) include a middle-east dummy
and (ii) include a monarchy dummy (Cheibub et al. 2010) in the baseline specication. This implies that
either the duration of dictatorships in the middle-east diers from the rest of the world or that duration of
monarchistic authorized dictators diers from the duration of non-monarchs. Surprisingly, the empirical
ndings support the view that monarchistic authorized dictators survival time is reduced in comparison
to other dictators. With respect to the middle east dummy survival time of dictators in this region does
not systematically dier from dictators located in other parts of the world. However, the eects of our
variables of most interest are again robust against this modications. The results are available from the
authors upon request.
16Table 4: Robustness Checks: Sub Samples
Distribution Exponential Exponential Exponential
Metric AFT AFT AFT
(1) (2) (3)
Variable
Entry Age  6:614  0:105  5:459
(1:732) (0:559) (2:351)
Median Survival  0:269 0:487 33:872
(1:196) (0:256) (45:030)
GDP p.c.  2:676 0:358 2:595
(1:112) (0:366) (6:766)
GDP Growth  2:669 5:162 13:952
(4:048) (2:979) (10:806)
Population  0:337  0:771  1:914
(0:306) (0:227) (3:592)
Rents From Other Natural Resources 0:080 0:021 0:624
(0:073) (0:015) (0:687)
Oil Production 0:844 0:504 0:704
(0:316) (0:192) (0:405)
Oil World Price  1:044  4:680  3:847
(1:061) (1:412) (1:333)
Oil Production * Oil World Price  0:200  0:169  0:353
(0:088) (0:062) (0:077)
Constant 52:00 17:173  65:265
(19:402) (5:480) (61:549)
# of Observations 182 197 73
# of Dictators 22 52 11
Subsample (polity2) -10, -9 -8, -7 -10
BIC 68.662 130.026 39.500
Notes: Clustered Standard errors in parenthesis. The symbols ,  and  stand
for signicant at 10%, 5% and 1% level. The BIC values are only comparable for
models with the same number if observations.
The rst two columns of Table 4 show the estimation results for a more and less severe
dictatorship denition, while the results in the last column correspond to the most severe
dictators according the polity2 indicator. In comparison to the baseline specication, we
lose some observations due to the reason that only dictators which remain in the corre-
sponding subgroup (i.e show a polity2 value of -10 to -9, or -8 to -7 ,or -10) over their
whole leadership duration are included in the estimation procedure. The eects of several
control variables on the dictatorship duration for the sub-samples are mostly ambiguous.
Only for the impact of country size and rents from other natural resources on dictator
duration does the direction of inuence remain unaected. Additionally, almost all vari-
ables change their level of signicance in the dierent sub-samples. However, the impact
of the variables of interest (oil production and world oil price) are hardly aected by the
sample modications. Especially, oil production (signicantly) increases the duration of
a dictatorship for both, relatively large sub-sample as well as the sample of the eleven
most extreme dictators, while the oil price exhibits a strong negative impact in various
subsamples. This result indicates that the theoretically expected enforcing eect of oil




Entry Age  0:980  1:309
(0:639) (0:686)
Median Survival 0:382 0:710
(0:180) (0:221)
GDP p.c. 0:053  0:020
(0:371) (0:390)




Rents From Other Natural Resources  0:007 0:003
(0:015) (0:027)
Oil Production 0:465 0:360
(0:177) (0:209)
Oil World Price  2:972  2:435
(1:288) (1:382)




# of Observations 212 222
# of Dictators 45 32
BIC 139.942 105.073
Notes: Clustered Standard errors in parenthesis. The symbols ,
 and  stand for signicant at 10%, 5% and 1% level. The BIC
values are only comparable for models with the same number if
observations.
production on the stability of dictatorship appears very robust to several dierent deni-
tions of dictatorship.
Non-democratic regimes can be characterized by their use of repression and loyalty
(Wintrobe 1990). `Tinpots' try to maximize personal consumption and reduce the costs
of staying in power. In contrast, `Totalitarians' will use more of a country's (natural)
resources to maximize power. We therefore apply a further robustness analysis to check
if the eects of the oil variables dier between dierent types of autocratic regimes. We
construct a variable that identies two types of regimes e.g. `Totalitarian' and `Tinpot'
based on their level of civil liberties and political rights, using the approach put forward in
Islam and Winer (2004). We split the sample using this regime-type variable and estimate
the baseline specication for each sub-sample separately. As can be seen in Table 5 our
key results stay robust for both sub-samples.
A number of studies nd a negative eect of natural resource endowment on institutional






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20In addition, the level of institutional quality can also have an impact on the dictator's
probability of staying in oce (e.g. Robinson 2006). We therefore test the robustness of
our results to the inclusion of a set of institutional variables: Firstly, authoritarian regimes
might dier in their level of institutional quality (e.g. economic and political freedom,
corruption). For example, Easton and Walker (1997) shows that lower levels of economic
freedom can decreases economic growth. Higher levels of corruption can also decrease eco-
nomic growth (Mauro 1995) and increase inequality (Gupta et al. 2002). We control for
the indirect eect of institutions and income relationship on dictator's survival by includ-
ing both the level and growth rate of GDP per capita. However, institutions can also aect
the dictator's rent extraction opportunities and the ability of the dictator to use resource
rents to increase survival probability (Robinson 2006). Secondly, the dictator's survival
probability also depends on the level of repression he applies on potential kingmakers
(Wintrobe 1990). For example, Bellin (2004) argues that the prevalence of authoritari-
anism throughout the Middle-East and North Africa is mainly due to the existence of a
coercive state apparatus that suppresses any attempt of regime change. Thirdly, Collier
and Hoeer (2004) argue that fractionalization can increase the likelihood of civil war
and Hodler (2006) shows the relationship between natural resources, fractionalization and
conict. Table 6 tests for the robustness of our results to account for these arguments.
Columns 1-3 include additional controls for economic freedom (Economic Freedom In-
dex (Heritage Foundation 2009)) and freedom of corruption (Freedom from Corruption
(Heritage Foundation 2009) and Corruption Control (Kaufmann et al. 2005)). Columns
4-6 control for measures of political freedom (Rule of Law Index (Kaufmann et al. 2005),
Repressive Actions (Freedom House 2008) and Political Terror Scale (Gibney et al. 2009)).
Finally, columns 7-9 investigate the robustness of our results to the inclusion of dierent
measures of fractionalization (Ethnic, Linguistic and Religious Fractionalization (Alesina
et al. 2003)). Our previous results hardly change when controlling for these factors.
In order to test whether our hypothesis holds for other natural resources, we estimate the
baseline specication for 11 other resources (including fuel resources and minerals). The
results from these regressions are reported in Table 7. There is support for our theoretical
model in the case of gas, gold, silver and lead. The estimates with the remaining resources
neither support nor reject our hypotheses. One possible explanation for this is that some
of these resources such as bauxite or phosphate are only produced by a few countries.13
Finally, Figure 4 shows the parameter of oil production and the corresponding 95 percent
condence interval, based on the baseline specication, for the whole range of oil prices in
our sample. The condence intervals are calculated using standard errors obtained from
the Delta method (Ai and Norton 2003). At average annual oil prices below 18 dollars
the paramter of oil production is positive and signicant. With increasing oil prices the
parameter becomes smaller and insignicant. At oil prices above 28 dollars per barrel the
overall oil production parameter becomes negative, but stays insignicant throughtout
the whole oil prices in our sample. With respect to the theoretical setting put forward
above, this non-monotonic impact of oil production of the survival time of dictators might
be explained by the non-tradeable, xed natural resources which are exclusively used by
13For example, bauxite production is mainly concentrated in China and Guinea (at least in our sample).
21the dictator. The fact that the non-tradeable part of the oil resources becomes more
valuable may induce nonlinearities in the reward function of the dictator (W(p)), which
may counteract the positive eect on duration which was highlighted in the model.
Figure 4: Parameter of Oil Production - Baseline Specication
224 Conclusions
The main goal of this paper is to assess empirically whether oil is a boon or a bane for
dictators. Anecdotal evidence gives us contradictory examples relating oil abundance
and dictatorship duration: Muammar al-Gadda, being in power since 1969 in oil-rich
Lybia is a prominent example that oil can be a dictator's friend. In contrast, the large
amount of coup d' etats in Nigeria indicate that oil could become a curse for a dictator.
In order to provide a systematic analysis of this contraticting anecdotal observations, we
develop a theoretical setting that stresses the eect of natural resources on the duration of
dicators in taking into account the incentives to maximize oil prots from the side of the
dictator and the incentives to take over power from the group of kingmakers. It suggests
that autocratic rulers of countries with higher oil endowment stay longer in power. In
addition, these theoretical predictions are strongly supported by our empirical ndings.
Our results contribute to the broad discussion on the natural resource curse and the
relationship between oil and democracy.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to two anonymous referees, the editor in chief (William F. Shughart
II), Axel Dreher, Martin Gassebner, Richard Jong-A-Pin, Michael Pfaermayr, Michael
Ross, Mark Schelker, Herbert Stocker, the participants of the annual meeting of the Aus-
trian Economic Association (NOeG) 2009 in Linz and the participants of the 24th annual
congress of the European Economic Association 2009 in Barcelona for useful comments
and suggestions. Financial support from the 'Oesterreichische Nationalbank' (OeNB,
grant no. 12831) is gratefully acknowledged.
References
Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J. A. and Verdier, T. (2004), `Alfred Marshall Lecture: Klep-
tocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule', Journal of the European
Economic Association 2(2-3), 162{192.
Acemoglu, D., Ticchi, D. and Vindigni, A. (2008), A Theory of Military Dictatorship,
NBER Working Paper Series 13915, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Ai, C. and Norton, E. C. (2003), `Interaction Terms in Logit and Probit Models', Eco-
nomics Letters 80(1), 123{129.
Alvarez, M., Cheibub, J., Limongi, F. and Przeworski, A. (1996), `Classifying Political
Regimes', Studies in Comparative International Development 3(1), 3{36.
Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S. and Wacziarg, R., (2003), `Frac-
tionalization', Journal of Economic Growth 8, 155{194.
23Bar-El, R. (2009), `Dictators, Development, and the Virtue of Political Instability', Public
Choice 138, 29{44.
Becker, G. S. (1983), `A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political
Inuence', Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371{400.
Bellin, E. (2004), `The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptional-
ism in Comparative Perspective', Comparative Politics 36(2), 139{157.
Bhattacharyya, S. and Hodler, R. (2010), `Natural Resources,Democracy and Corruption',
European Economic Review forthcoming.
Bienen, H. and van der Walle, N. (1992), `A Proportional Hazard Model of Leadership
Duration', Journal of Politics 54(3), 685{717.
Caselli, F. (2006), Power Struggles and the Natural Resource Curse, mimeo, Department
of Economics, London School of Economics.
Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J. and Vreeland, J. R. (2010), `Democracy and Dictatorship
Revisited', Public Choice forthcoming
Cleves, M. A., Gould, W. M. and Gutierrez, R. G. (2004), An Introduction to Survival
Analysis using Stata, revised edn, Stata Press.
Collier, P. and Hoeer, A. (2004), `Greed and Grievance in Civil War', Oxford Economic
Papers 56, 563{595.
Crespo-Cuaresma, J., Lutz, W. and Sanderson, W. (2008), `The Demography of Educa-
tional Attainment and Economic Growth', Science 319(5866), 1047{1048.
Easton, S. T. and Walker, M. A. (1997), `Income, Growth, and Economic Freedom',
American Economic Review 87(2), 328{332.
Freedom House (2008), Freedom in the World, Annual report,
http://www.freedomhouse.org.
Gallego, M. and Pitchik, C. (2004), `An Economic Theory of Leadership Turnover', Jour-
nal of Public Economics 88(12), 2361{2382.
Gibney, M. and Cornett, L. and Wood, R. (2009), Political Terror Scale 1976-2007,
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org.
Goemans, H., Gleditisch, K. S. and Chiozza, G. (2007), `Archigos. A Data Set on Leaders
1875-2004', Version 2.8.
Grossman, H. I. (1991), `A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections', American Eco-
nomic Review 81(4), 912{921.
Gupta, S., Davoodi, H. and Alonso-Terme, R. (2002), `Does Corruption Aect Income
Inequality and Poverty', Economics of Governance 3, 23{45.
Heritage Foundation (2009), 2009 Index of Economic Freedom, http://www.heritage.org.
24Heston, A., Summers, R. and Aten, B. (2006), `Penn World Table Version', Version 6.2.
Hodler, R. (2006), `The Curse of Natural Resources in Fractionalized Countries', European
Economic Review 50, 1367{1386.
Islam, M. M. and Winer, S. L. (2004), `Tinpots, Totalitarians (and Democrats): An
Empirical Investigation of Economic Growth on Civil Liberties and Political Rights',
Public Choice 118, 289{323.
Kalbeisch, J. D. and Prentice, R. L. (2002), The Statistical Analysis of Failure Time
Data, 2nd edn, Wiley.
Kaufmann, D. and Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M. (2005), Governance matters IV: Gov-
ernance indicators for 1996-2004, Policy Research Working Paper 3630, The World
Bank, Washington, DC, http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance.
Kurrild-Klitgaard, P. (2000 ), `The Constitutional Economics of Autocratic Succession',
Public Choice 103, 63{84.
Leite, C. and Weidmann, J. (2002 ), `Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources,
Corruption, and Economic Growth', In Abed, G. and Gupta, S. (Eds.), Governance,
Corruption, and Economic Performance., 159{196, Washington, DC: IMF.
Lipset, S. M. (1960), Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, Anchor Books, New
York.
Lutz, W., Goujon, A., Samir, K. C. and Sanderson, W. (2007), `Reconstruction of Popu-
lation by Age, Sex and Level of Educational Attainment', Vienna Yearbook of Pop-
ulation Research Vol. 2007, 193{225.
Marshall, M. G. and Jaggers, K. (2005), `Polity IV Project. Political Regime Character-
istics and Transition, 1800-2004', Version 2004.
Mauro, P. (1995), `Corruption and Growth', Quarterly Journal of Economics 110(3), 681{
712.
McGuire, M. C. and Olson, M. C. (1996), `The Economics of Autocracy and Majority
Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force', Journal of Economic Literature
34(1), 72{96.
Morrison, K. M. (2007 ), `Natural Resources, Aid, and Democratization: A best-case
Scenario', Public Choice 131, 365{386.
Olson, M. C. (1965), The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Olson, M. C. (1991), `Autocracy, Democracy and Prosperity', In Zeckhauser, R. (Ed.)
Strategy and Choice, 131{157, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Olson, M. C. (1993), `Dictatorship, Democracy , and Development', American Political
Science Review 87(3), 567{576.
25Olson, M. C. (2000), Power and Prosperity, New York: Basic Books.
van der Ploeg, F. (2007), Africa and Natural Resources: Managing Natural Resources for
Sustainable Growth, Background Paper, African Development Bank.
Robinson, E. A. G. (1960), Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations, St. Martin's,
London.
Robinson, J. A., Torvik, R. and Verdier, T. (2006), `Political Foundations of the Resource
Curse', Journal of Development Economics 79, 447{468.
Ross, M. L. (2001), `Does Oil Hinder Democracy?', World Politics 53, 325{361.
Sala-i-Martin, X. and Subramanian A. (2003), Addressing the Natural Resource Curse:
An Illustration from Nigeria, NBER Working Paper Series 9804, National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Smith, B. (2004), `Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960-1999',
American Journal of Political Science 48(2), 232{246.
Tornell, A. and Lane, P. R. (1999), `The Voracity Eect', American Economic Review
89(1), 22{46.
Tsui, K. K. (2005), More Oil, Less Democracy?: Theory and Evidence from Crude Oil
Discoveries, mimeo, Department of Economics, University of Chicago.
Tullock, G. (1987), Autocracy, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Tullock, G. (2005), The Social Dilemma of: Autocracy, Revolution and Coup d' etat, Lib-
erty Fund.
Wintrobe, R. (1990), `The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dicta-
torship', American Political Science Review 84(3), 849{872.
26